URFIG-supported Document about China
The advantages and disadvantages
of China’ s accession to WTO
and the related debates
(Prof.
Han Deqian, economist at Beijing University, 27 June 2001)
Thanks to
Mr. Per GAHRTON and Green/EFA Group in European Parliament for offering me the
chance to present my view here.
The title
of my lecture is “The advantages and disadvantages of China’ s accession to
WTO and the related debates”. It might take twenty minutes or so. I would be
pleased to answer questions that may arise.
First of
all, I must declare that all the viewpoints stated bellow are only my own
opinions and have nothing to do with my government and my university. I am among
the few scholars in China who have been consistently criticizing WTO, IMF, the
World Bank, Globalization and Neoliberalism. Understandably, I am very concerned
about the consequences of China’s accession to WTO. Unfortunately, this is not
the attitude of the mainstream media in China.
The first
point is that China’s accession to WTO will bring about more disadvantages
than advantages.
Chinese enterprises do not have adequate competitiveness in international markets. General Motor alone has annual revenue comparable to the total annual gross revenue of China’s first 500 enterprises, and the average gross revenue of China’s first 500 enterprises is only 2% of that of the top 500 in the world. It’s true that China ranks in the front of the world as far as the total volume of several products are concerned, such as steel, cement, coal, cotton, fertilizer, electricity, color TV, refrigerator, air conditioner, or motorcycle, but the large quantity is produced by hundreds of thousands of firms, each of them remains small in scale. This implies that China’s average industrial concentration is too low to compete with their foreign counterparts. The level of equipment is more backward, which results in more energy consumption of per unit product, lower quality and performance. Further more, China’s enterprises are seriously short of capital in general and have no ability to improve technology and market share rapidly. Besides, few China’s products are famous internationally, so high quality products are not offered high prices, which means lower profits and higher costs.
Apparently,
if China’s enterprises compete with transnational corporations under such
conditions, a great number of them must go bankrupt, or be taken over by the
latter. In fact, industries of beverage, beer, detergent, bicycle, paper,
medical, elevator, computer, aviation, and machine tools are all controlled by
transnational corporations, at least the high value-added markets of these
industries have been totally conquered by foreign companies. Other industries
under more strict protection of government, such as automobile industry,
petrochemical industry, steel industry, coal industry, even agriculture, are
under the serious threat of imported products and the penetration of
transnational corporations. Some domestic firms of these industries have become
the production base of transnational corporations. Hence, China’s enterprises
have been suffering from decreasing profit since 1996, and forced to dismiss
workers, reduce wages and freeze up welfare, many of which went bankrupt. It’s
necessary to note that one of the results has been that the bad debts in
China’s major banks have been soaring. In my opinion, the primary reason for
the rising bad debts is due to the fierce competition, especially the
competition from foreign enterprises and imported goods, the second important
reason is corruption.
I want to
emphasize the issue of agriculture. As known to all, the rural population in
China adds up to 900 million, 500 million of which have the ability to work. The
average house owned land is only 0.4 hectare. To insure such tiny land produce
enough food, the price of food must be maintained at a high level, which means
the price of the main agriculture products such as wheat, rice, and corn of
China is constantly higher than that of international market. The price of
agriculture has kept decreasing since 1996. The price fell to such a level that
per hectare wheat brought 120$ loss to peasants in the autumn of 2000, while an
average peasant’s annual income in pure agriculture area is only 80$. In
addition, almost 600 million people live in pure agriculture area. If the “ Agriculture Cooperation Agreement between P.R.C and
U.S.A” is implemented after China joins WTO, the income of peasants must go
down steeply, more land must lie waste, more peasant must flush into every city
and fall into poverty trap without any hope.
As a
result, China’s GDP might increase temporarily, but employment, tax and wage
per GDP unit will decrease continuously. More important, China will no longer
have an independent industrial system, and become the production base of
transnational corporations. Most rural population will lose their land and
income. Financial system might collapse because of increased bad debts.
Meanwhile, China will have no ability to construct a social security system with
enough money because the government couldn’t impose enough tax upon foreign
enterprises, which will certainly deteriorate public security.
Then,
second question naturally arises: why is China so eager to join WTO?
A great
many of people feel it’s hard to understand the motivation of China’s
accession to WTO. However, China’s mainstream media save no enthusiasm to
praise WTO. They loudly proclaim that accession to WTO will speed up the step of
reform and opening up policy, motivate the energy of China’s enterprises
before international competition, normalize China’s market economy, and
finally make China run in the same orbit as the developed country. If some
enterprises are eliminated, it’s only the necessary cost of China’s
development. More media appeal to consumers implying that they will be able to
buy more high quality imported goods with less money.
But no voice from businesses directly faced with international competition appears on media. Collective enterprises owned by villages and towns or private enterprises are too small to compete directly with transnational corporations, and their main rivals are domestic firms. Although these small businesses feel vaguely the threat from foreign goods, they have little information about the whole situation, no organization, and no representation in political affairs. Most big enterprises still belong to the state, leaders of which are appointed by central or local government, and don’t bear final responsibility of the enterprises. If the government is dedicated to join WTO, they will raise their hands automatically. For the sake of personal income, these leaders will have the possibility to enjoy as high salary as their foreign counterparts, which far outweighs their concern for the over all interest of the enterprises. Workers and peasants ought to show different opinions, but they are much less informed and organized, they even don’t know what the WTO is.
What kind
of force could get rid of all these obstacles and push forward the process of
accession to WTO? The answer lies in the logic and history of China’s
reform-open policy. It is generally considered that, reform-open policy leaves
Chinese economy grow rapidly, and the living standards of Chinese people improve
rapidly. However, the thing is not so simple. The core of reform opening up
policy is the introduction of market logic, which means to put the development
in the hands of those with desire and ability to become wealthy, which at the
same time means to let the law of the jungle start functioning. It’s
interesting that at the first stage of reform opening up policy the law of the
jungle began to function in every level except the top, which initiatively gives
up a part of power and benefit, therefore the dominant factor isn’t the law of
the jungle. Before 1985, the central government improved the price of
agriculture product and the wage of workers while the consumer price kept
frozen. Local governments and state-operated enterprises gained more
self-determination power and were able to use bonus and allowance. As a result,
the largest and weakest group won
more share in wealth distribution, which promoted development strongly. The
reform opening up policy won support from all social groups.
It’s the
honey month between stronger and weaker. Since 1985, the government had no power
and benefit to give up, the officials became conscious of the power in their
hand, and moral constraint began to exit from daily life, so the law of the
jungle gradually dominated all kind of social and economic activities. The
increasement of peasants’ income grew slowly while peasants’ burden grew
rapidly. Leaders of state-owned enterprises gradually seized more profit and put
them into private wallets through all kinds of ways, on the contrary, the
political position and relative income of workers fell continuously. Day after
day, no person cared about the integral and long term benefit, every one, from
top to bottom, even workers, learned to use power for himself, and state-owned
enterprises became the object shared by all kinds of forces. Furthermore,
collective enterprises owned by villages and towns and private enterprises
occupied the lower level market, and transnational corporations and joint
ventures occupied the upper level market, so the outside circumstance of
state-owned enterprise became very serious. In a word, state-owned enterprises
are dying gradually under the internal erosion and external pressure.
This
process produced a large wealthy group which included cadres in all levels of
government who held real power, leaders in state-owned enterprises, grass roots
cadres in countryside, leaders of collective enterprises owned by villages and
towns, owners of private enterprises, and those working as white-collar in
foreign capital enterprises.
It must be
noticed that foreign capital once played a positive actor in China’s economic
development. During 1980s, the scale and level of foreign capital was relatively
low, constituted mainly of capital from HongKong, Macao, and Taiwan, which
didn’t threaten China’s enterprises but gave an example for business
operation, Meanwhile the government adopted a strict protectionism policy.
Therefore domestic market had been very boom for five years or so, supply all
kinds of products once fell short of demand. The internal and external problem
of state-owned enterprises existed but not so serious.
But at the
end of 1980s, overproduction visited every walk of life, and competition became
very fierce. In other word, China ran into its first economic crisis, the most
notable mark of which was “triangle debts”. To solve the crisis, it is
necessary to enlarge domestic demand, reduce the gap between the wealthy and the
poverty, and absorb overproduction capability, using financial, monetary and
taxation tools. But this solution was excluded from the beginning, because it
couldn’t gain support from the new wealthy group, against the logic of the law
of the jungle. The real choice was much more application of the law of the
jungle, namely opening door much larger to foreign capital, hoping foreign
direct investment could draw up the growth. After 1992, the publication of
famous speech of Deng, all level governments in every district competed with
each other to supply more favorable treatments to attract foreign capital. Many
lands were named “developing zone”, in which governments were responsible
for high standard infrastructure. Not surprisingly, a great boom formed because
of the building of real estates and infrastructures in developing zones, all the
storage were sold out, and the idle production capability was put into use. But
the boom ended as rapidly as it appeared. The day the real estate was built up,
the day the building was idle. The prices of real estates fell sharply. For
example, in Hainan Province and Guangxi Province, the prices dropped to 10% of
their original level. A similar story is taking place in the entire China
economy. All competitive industries went into a descending spiral. The prices of
color TVs, refrigerators, air conditioners, motorcycles, etc. go down more than
50%. Idle capacities were much more than that of the last crisis. It may seem
strange from an European’s perspective: didn’t China economy grow at 7%
annually? Yes, but the growth only existed in foreign direct investment and
export/import, which at the same time compressed the market space of domestic
industries, and aggravated the domestic economic crisis. Indeed, foreign direct
investments focused in two fields, one was high value-added industries such as
automobile, medical, chemical, and micro-electricity etc., another one was
labor-concentration export-intended industries such as toy, shoe, leather, and
garment etc. Though export-intended industries brought about some employments,
the wage were too low to compensate the lost high wage employments in high
value-added industries. More uncomfortable to China’s long-term interest,
China will lose independent industrial ability. To indicate how China’s
economy relies on foreign capital and markets, the ratio of the sum of export
and import to GDP rose to 46% in 2000.
During the
process that China economy fell into the long term deflation crisis from the
boom bubble burst in 1990s, the law of the jungle functioned to its’ extreme.
Workers and peasants experienced a ten years’ stagnation of income, while
cadres in central government and rich area governments experienced ten times of
growth of income, white-collar employees and intellectuals gained even more.
These three groups are the core force in current China’s politics, economics,
and culture. They are all benefit from the foreign-oriented economy, even
benefit from the lasting deflation. In their eyes, if domestic growth needs more
tax, less imported goods, then it must be the worst solution. Hence, when China
economy faced with the choice of accession or not to WTO, they automatically
support joining in WTO.
This social
motivation is summarized implicitly by China’s political language as: join in
WTO, so reform and opening up policy won’t be reversed. It could be understood
as: join in WTO, so the wallet of the richer won’t be under threat.
Here comes
the third question, how could the public be persuaded?
Actually,
the Chinese rich will be dependent upon transnational corporations if China’s
accession to WTO does take place, thus they won’t be so enthusiastic to
support WTO if they are clearly aware of the probable consequences. It does no
good to other countries and most of the people in the world if China loses the
ability to grow independently and become a country competing with others by its
low wage level. However, such a “fail-fail” game was indeed said to be a
“win-win” game by Chinese media and world media, why?
I think the
reason lies in the neoliberalism which dominates the academia and public
opinion, and which has been recommended strongly by transnational corporations.
Almost all Chinese economists embrace Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” and
its modern representative like Milton Friedman, every leader in all level of
governments is trained by the Smith’s dogma. In fact, it’s Adam Smith not
Karl Marx who is the real hierophant. Hence they believe in market economy and
free trade unconditionally. With no exception, the media, reporters and editors
are all the embracers of Smith’s dogma, them seldom know that protectionism
rather than free trade is the secret prescription of development of America,
German, France, Japan, even the Great Britain. In their eyes, protectionism is
equivalent to “close the door”.
It’s very
interesting that under the surface of rejecting the western model China learn
every thing from America with the reform and opening up policy. America
sparkplug neoliberalism, then neoliberalism become fashion in China; Nasdaq
upswings, the second board stock market become the top topic of China’s
capital market; American communication industry opens to competition, China’s
communication industry become eager to be dismantled. This kind of thinking
model plays an important role in persuading the public.
The fourth
point I would like to point out is that things are changing.
With the
explosion of Asian financial crisis, with the rapid growth of unemployed
population and the deterioration of the countryside, with more state-owned
enterprises went bankrupt, public emotion against market-oriented reform
strengthened. In economic academia, critique to IMF and Washington consensus
from several American economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman
brought influence evidently. The translation of “ globalization trap: attack
on democracy and welfare” written by two German reporters gave a shock to
intellectuals both inside and outside economics academia. It suffice to say that
anti-neoliberalism forces are developing quickly.
Since the
first half of 1999, I have written many papers criticizing the policy of
accession to WTO and the related treaties. My book “ Collision: Globalization
trap and China’s reality choice” was finished at July 15, 1999, and was
published at January 2000. Though I fell under all kinds of pressures and
difficulties, I do gain more support from broad bases. To my surprise, China’s
central policy research institute published long summary of my book, and the
journal “International Trade” belonging to Ministry of Foreign Trade and
economic Cooperation published my article “thinking of anti-globalization”.
In addition, dozen of magazines gave abstract of and made comments on my view. I
was invited to attend different kinds of seminars or give lectures. At the
beginning of every lecture, I was in the minority, and when I finished speech, I
became one of the majority.
It’s evident that the Chinese economic academia has been split. Those neoliberalist scholars still command the majority, but have lost their arrogance, while anti-neoliberalist scholars are the minority but are now more confident and encouraged with the justice on their side. I think it might fit in the Chinese proverb “moral isn’t alone, it must have neighbors”, therefore I could come here and introduce my opinion. I believe deeply that democratic forces all over the world must oppose neoliberalism and make it illegal because it promotes polarization, tragedies, and disasters in every front and in every corner of the world.